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The	theory	of	System	Health	Management	(SHM)	and	of	its	operational	subset	Fault	Management	
(FM)	states	that	FM	is	implemented	as	a	“meta”	control	loop,	known	as	an	FM	Control	Loop	(FMCL).	
The	FMCL	detects	that	all	or	part	of	a	system	is	now	failed,	or	in	the	future	will	fail	(that	is,	cannot	be	
controlled	within	acceptable	limits	to	achieve	its	objectives),	and	takes	a	control	action	(a	response)	
to	return	the	system	to	a	controllable	state.	In	terms	of	control	theory,	the	effectiveness	of	each	FMCL	
is	estimated	based	on	its	ability	to	correctly	estimate	the	system	state,	and	on	the	speed	of	its	
response	to	the	current	or	impending	failure	effects.	This	paper	describes	how	this	theory	has	been	
successfully	applied	on	the	National	Aeronautics	and	Space	Administration’s	(NASA)	Space	Launch	
System	(SLS)	Program	to	quantitatively	estimate	the	effectiveness	of	proposed	abort	triggers	so	as	to	
select	the	most	effective	suite	to	protect	the	astronauts	from	catastrophic	failure	of	the	SLS.		The	
premise	behind	this	process	is	to	be	able	to	quantitatively	provide	the	value	versus	risk	trade‐off	for	
any	given	abort	trigger,	allowing	decision	makers	to	make	more	informed	decisions.		
	
All	current	and	planned	crewed	launch	vehicles	have	some	form	of	vehicle	health	management	
system	integrated	with	an	emergency	launch	abort	system	to	ensure	crew	safety.	While	the	design	
can	vary,	the	underlying	principle	is	the	same:	detect	imminent	catastrophic	vehicle	failure,	initiate	
launch	abort,	and	extract	the	crew	to	safety.	Abort	triggers	are	the	detection	mechanisms	that	
identify	that	a	catastrophic	launch	vehicle	failure	is	occurring	or	is	imminent	and	cause	the	initiation	
of	a	notification	to	the	crew	vehicle	that	the	escape	system	must	be	activated.	While	ensuring	that	the	
abort	triggers	provide	this	function,	designers	must	also	ensure	that	the	abort	triggers	do	not	signal	
that	a	catastrophic	failure	is	imminent	when	in	fact	the	launch	vehicle	can	successfully	achieve	orbit.	
That	is,	the	abort	triggers	must	have	low	false	negative	rates	to	be	sure	that	real	crew‐threatening	
failures	are	detected,	and	also	low	false	positive	rates	to	ensure	that	the	crew	does	not	abort	from	
non‐crew‐threatening	launch	vehicle	behaviors.		
	
The	analysis	process	described	in	this	paper	is	a	compilation	of	over	six	years	of	lessons	learned	and	
refinements	from	experiences	developing	abort	triggers	for	NASA’s	Constellation	Program	(Ares	I	
Project)	and	the	SLS	Program,	as	well	as	the	simultaneous	development	of	SHM/FM	theory.	The	
paper	will	describe	the	abort	analysis	concepts	and	process,	developed	in	conjunction	with	SLS	
Safety	and	Mission	Assurance	(S&MA)	to	define	a	common	set	of	mission	phase,	failure	scenario,	and	
Loss	of	Mission	Environment	(LOME)	combinations	upon	which	the	SLS	Loss	of	Mission	(LOM)	
Probabilistic	Risk	Assessment	(PRA)	models	are	built.	This	abort	analysis	also	requires	strong	
coordination	with	the	Multi‐Purpose	Crew	Vehicle	(MPCV)	and	SLS	Structures	and	Environments	
(STE)	to	formulate	a	series	of	abortability	tables	that	encapsulate	explosion	dynamics	over	the	ascent	
mission	phase.	The	design	and	assessment	of		abort	conditions	and	triggers	to	estimate	their	Loss	of	
Crew	(LOC)	Benefits	also	requires	in‐depth	integration	with	other	groups,	including	Avionics,	
Guidance,	Navigation	and	Control(GN&C),	the	Crew	Office,	Mission	Operations,	and	Ground	Systems.	
The	outputs	of	this	analysis	are	a	critical	input	to	SLS	S&MA’s	LOC	PRA	models.	
	
The	process	described	here	may	well	be	the	first	full	quantitative	application	of	SHM/FM	theory	to	
the	selection	of	a	sensor	suite	for	any	aerospace	system.		
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